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EMBRACING THE INEVITABLE: RETHINKING AND RESHAPING
ANTITRUST LAW RE: VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Travis C. Wheeler*
You know how this is going to turn out, don't you?
No. Do you?
Yes. I do. I think you do too. You just haven't accepted it yet.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current state of vertical restraints analysis in the United States' antitrust
law is confusing, counter-intuitive, and inefficient in its overall application.
Antitrust law, like the law generally, tends to move in an efficiency-enhancing
direction over time because inefficient laws are more likely to be challenged and
judges, more often than not, tend to issue efficiency-enhancing rulings. Rather
than wait for the inevitable, this Article proposes that fair readings of the
academic literature, the case law, and the antitrust laws themselves support
simple and efficient interpretations for all vertical restraints that will provide
clarity to businesses and attorneys and enhance overall efficiency in the
application of vertical restraints law.
Since 1890, the Sherman Act has outlawed agreements that unreasonably
restrain trade.2 Certain agreements in restraint of trade are so pernicious that
they are per se illegal.3 There is no defense-not hat the restraint is reasonable
(or even pro-competitive), not that prices were not raised but merely stabilized,
not that the agreements brought order to a chaotic and undisciplined market, not
even that it is necessary for the parties to the agreement o keep from going out
of business. Agreements that fall within this camp of per se illegality include
horizontal agreements to fix, raise, or stabilize prices, agreements to allocate,
markets, customers, products, or territories, agreements to rig bids, and certain
group boycotts.4 All other restraints are subject to "rule of reason" analysis.
* Adjunct Professor of Law (Antitrust & Trade Regulation and Law & Economics), University of
South Carolina and Member, Nexsen Pruet, LLC; J.D., Duke University School of Law with High Honors and
Order of the Coif.
1. CORMAC MCCARTHY, No COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN 184 (Alfred A. Knoph 2005).
2. See 15 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
3. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that "there are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.").
4. To qualify as per se illegal, a group boycott must be committed by firms with, collectively, market
power. See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1990) (acknowledging thatper se treatment
of boycotts is limited to "cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to
discourage them from doing business with a competitor"). Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). Absent such market power, the refusals to deal will be very
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Vertical agreements (e.g., agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor
or a distributor and a retailer) were once afforded the same harsh condemnation
as is reserved for these horizontal agreements. For example, agreements capping
the maximum fixed price were, for a short while, deemed per se illegal.5
Intrabrand vertical non-price restraints (e.g., distributorships assigned exclusive
geographic territories by a manufacturer) were also once condemned as per se
illegal.6 Intrabrand vertical price restraints were subject to the per se rule from
19117 until 2007.8 Since 2007, intrabrand vertical price restraints (primarily
resale price maintenance agreements) have been evaluated pursuant to the rule of
reason.
Over the last 50 years, the Supreme Court has chipped away at the per se
rule that was once applied liberally to vertical restraints. This general shift away
from a significant concern with vertical restraints followed the "Chicago
School"9 drive to retool antitrust doctrines to track efficiency. Robert Bork's
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX1 o led the charge, with Richard Posner and Frank
Easterbrook (all Chicago professors turned Federal appellate court judges)
following close behind. In defending vertical restraints (not just from per se
analysis, but from condemnation generally), Bork argued that it is never efficient
to condemn vertical restraints, including resale price maintenance, non-price
territorial restrictions,1 and both primary and secondary price discrimination.
While Bork may too quickly be dismissed as a monopolist apologist, his
influence in shaping modern antitrust doctrine cannot be overstated. In large
part due to the direct influence of Bork and other Chicago School academicians,
all vertical restraints, with the very technical exception of certain tying
agreements, are now adjudged pursuant to "rule of reason" analysis. All that
remains in the per se camp (at least on paper) is a muddled "quasi per se" tying
unlikely to have any appreciable effect on competition generally, and therefore of no real concern from an
antitrust perspective.
5. See State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145
(1968)). Not surprisingly, no one really attempts to bring maximum resale price claims (likely because there
are no damages, and, sans damages, no aggrieved plaintiff). D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical
Restraints: Per se Illegality, The Rule of Reason, And Per se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1010 (2014),
available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/546 (noting that, since Kahn was decided, there have been
only "six cases" dealing with "actual claims of maximum RPM").
6. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (holding it per se illegal for a
manufacturer, after parting "with dominion over the product," to "restrict territory or persons to whom the
product may be transferred"), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977)
(returning non-price vertical restraints analysis to the rule of reason).
7. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911); see also
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES,
CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY (2d Ed. 2008), 356 (Thompson West) (noting that,
although "Dr. Miles did not itself use the 'per se' label, over time the Court, as well as lower courts and
commentators, consistently recognized the decision as holding that vertical price restraints are per se unlawful)
[hereinafter GAVIL, KOVACIC, & BAKER].
8. See Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (overruling Dr.
Miles).
9. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 925, 925
(1979).
10. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (The Free Press, 1st
ed. 1978).
11. Id. at 298.
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rule that is, at best, on life support.12 This, of course, does not mean that such
restraints are necessarily lawful, only that a defendant accused of a vertical
antitrust violation has the opportunity to mount a defense and that the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing the restraint's unreasonableness (i.e., that its
anticompetitive effects outweigh any of its pro-competitive benefits).13
The current framework is generally considered a marked improvement from
previous decades where pro-competitive vertical conduct was routinely
condemned by draconian application of rigid per se rules. Indeed, many forms
of vertical restraints (e.g., predatory pricing and maximum price fixing) are so
rarely successfully challenged that they are often regarded as per se legal under
Section 1.14 And therein lies the problem-they are not per se legal.
That these restraints are not immune from legal challenge is not as
universally accepted a proposition as it should be. Indeed, in 2014, Professor
Daniel Sokol argued that Bork's "per se dream" had been at least partially
recognized in three areas of vertical restraints: (1) maximum resale price
maintenance; (2) vertical territorial restrictions; and (3) Robinson-Patman Act
violations (price discrimination).15 To the academician, this may appear largely,
if not entirely true.
Of these forms of vertical restraint, maximum re-sale price maintenance
cases, which never result in injury to competition, are more rare than winged
unicorns. Maximum resale price maintenance is thus something of a
strawman-minimum resale price maintenance is what remains relevant today,
and, as discussed infra, we are quite far from a rule of per se legality in for
minimum resale price maintenance agreements. Vertical territorial restrictions
can be challenged under Section 1, generally only successfully when there is also
a claim under Section 2. The potential for a challenge, most likely brought by a
disgruntled recently terminated dealer or distributor, however, remains much
higher under the current applicable rule of reason standard than it need or should
be. Finally, price discrimination and, in particular, secondary line price
discrimination are certainly not "per se legal" in reality. Challenges may be
relatively infrequent, but they do occur and plaintiffs are still occasionally
successful.
Professor Sokol's article is thus illustrative of the differing perspectives of
academicians versus practitioners regarding the current law of vertical restraints.
While, in an academic sense, we are much closer to Bork's 1970s vision for the
future of antitrust, enough pitfalls remain that, in practice, risk averse market
participants cannot take much advantage of the movement away from per se
12. Indeed, even the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division argues that tying agreements
"should not be per se illegal." Competition and Monopoly: Single Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: Chapter 5, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-
monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-5. The DOJ notes that "many legal
scholars, commentators, economists, and others" have "questioned for decades whether tying should be
accorded per se treatment." Id. The per se rule is inappropriate for any tying analyses, the DOJ concludes,
because "tying has the potential to help consumers and cannot be said with any confidence to be
anticompetitive in almost all circumstances." Id.
13. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
14. Sokol, supra note 5.
15. See generally id. at 1010, 1013.
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rules regarding vertical restraints.
This article proposes a "nudge" (to use Twombly's1 6 terminology) in the
same, efficient direction towards which the law has been trending for close to
half a century. Specifically, this article proposes that all vertical restraints of
trade, rather than being subjected to a rule of reason analysis, should be deemed
per se legal under Section 1. This hypothesis would not allow for vertical
restraints-in and of themselves legal-to immunize other illegal
anticompetitive conduct, by virtue of incorporation of vertical restraints. For
instance, if vertical restraints are used to facilitate, coordinate, or maintain a
horizontal cartel, that cartel's conduct could still be prosecuted as a per se
violation of Section 1.17 Likewise, vertical restraints used by a monopolist to
maintain or enhance market power (e.g., by precluding competition to it) or
vertical restraints used in an attempt to achieve market power (by a firm with a
"dangerous probability" of doing so) may still be challenged as under Section
2.18 It has long been accepted that there are some things a monopolist may not
be permitted to do even if the same conduct would be perfectly legal if done by a
firm without market power.19 Tying, price discrimination or metering, or resale
price maintenance by a monopolist, for example might, in rare circumstances,
support a meritorious Section 2 claim.
Such a rule would greatly reduce confusion and uncertainty for businesses,
resulting in significant cost savings to firms for legal consultation and advice.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the current, tepid application of the
rule of reason requires firms to tailor downstream sales and distribution policies
around "worst case" scenarios, with the end result being substantial over-
deterrence.
The efficiencies created by this shift in the rule will far outweigh any costs
associated with "false acquittals" (vertical restraints that, while anticompetitive,
would no longer be condemned). And while certain vertical restraints may be
anticompetitive, this hypothesis recognizes that, if a vertical restraint is not being
used to facilitate a horizontal cartel or dominant firm's monopolization, it is
almost certainly not anticompetitive.
Part II of this article examines the evolution of the treatment of vertical
restraints under the Sherman Act, with a focus on: (a) vertical intrabrand non-
price restraints (territorial and customer restrictions); (b) vertical intrabrand price
restraints (resale price maintenance); (c) vertical interbrand restraints (exclusive
dealing and tying arrangements); and (d) price discrimination (both primary line
and secondary line). Part III examines the current state of the law and the
resultant inefficiencies from the perspective of both the academician and the
practitioner. Part IV proposes a solution that will enhance efficiencies in the law
by reducing: (a) costs to litigants, (b) uncertainties and risk of litigation to
16. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring antitrust plaintiffs, at the
pleading stage to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible").
17. See 15 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
19. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (holding that, "in the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal" (emphasis added)).
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market participants, and (c) burdens on American courts. Part V concludes that
these changes are inevitable, as the law marches slowly but surely towards
greater economic efficiency, and proposes that judges, legislators, and litigants
do their parts to speed the process.
II. HISTORY OF THE TREATMENT OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
A brief history of the law regarding different types of vertical restraints is
instructive. Vertical territorial and pricing restrictions were both once per se
illegal. The Robinson-Patman Act has prohibited price discrimination since it
was enacted in the middle of the Great Depression (1936). Tying agreements,
while often said to be subject to a "quasi per se" rule, has really always been
subject to a modified "rule of reason." At least on paper, there is currently a
distinction between ties in which a degree of forcing is probable (when the per se
tying rule is applied) and those that, despite market power in the tying product,
do not (when the "rule of reason" is applied). 20 The latter agreements can be
condemned under the rule of reason if they "foreclose a substantial tied market
share and lack an offsetting pro-competitive justification." 2 1
A. Vertical Intrabrand Non-Price Restraints
For a time, vertical intrabrand restraints were further subdivided, and
accorded disparate treatment, according to whether a restraint was a "price"
restraint or a "non-price" restraint. This was a rather curious distinction to make
in the vertical context. When this distinction was recognized in the vertical
context, it was ignored in the horizontal context, where non-price market,
territory, or customer allocation is no less per se illegal than agreements on
price. This is so because there is no practical difference in effect: an allocation
scheme can raise prices above a competitive level just as easily (if not more
easily) than an agreement among competitors to raise prices. Nevertheless, in
the context of vertical restraints, courts for a time maintained the fiction that
price and non-price restraints were materially and functionally different.
In Schwinn, the Supreme Court held that intrabrand, non-price, vertical
restraints were per se illegal.22 The United States had challenged Schwinn's
three-tier distribution system comprising, in addition to Schwinn itself, 22
intermediate distributors and a network of franchised retailers.23  Under
Schwinn's system, each distributor was granted a defined geographic area in
which it was granted the exclusive right to sell to franchised retailers.24 Only
franchised retailers were permitted to sell to the general public, and then only at
specified locations.2 5 The case came to the United States Supreme Court on
20. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16, 28-29 (1984) (noting that per se
condemnation is appropriate if anticompetitive forcing is likely).
21. Einer Elhauge, Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish: Why Ties without a Substantial Foreclosure Share
Should Not be Per se Legal, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 466 (2016).
22. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967), overruled by Continental
TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
23. See id. at 370.
24. See id. at 370-71.
25. See id. at 371.
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appeal by the United States from the district court's decision.26 On appeal, the
United States abandoned its per se theories, instead arguing, "Schwinn's
prohibition against distributors' and retailers' selling Schwinn bicycles to
nonfranchised retailers was unreasonable under § 1.1"27 Despite the Court
expressly acknowledging that the government had abandoned its per se theories
on appeal, the Court nevertheless articulated the following, bright, line, per se
rule of illegality: "Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an
article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it."28
Technically, then, Schwinn's holding sounded in property. Why? The
1977 version of the Court surmised that "[n]on-sale transactions appear to [have
been] excluded from the per se rule, not because of a greater danger of
intrabrand harm or a greater promise of interbrand benefit, but rather because of
the Court's unexplained belief that a complete per se prohibition would be too
'inflexibl(e). "'29
The GTE Sylvania Court acknowledged, just ten years after laying down
this somewhat gerrymandered per se rule in Schwinn, that vertical restrictions
"promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain
efficiencies in the distribution of his products."3 0 These "redeeming virtues"
allowed for, inter alia, "new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new
markets . . . to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of
investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of
products unknown to the consumer."3 1  In addition, as the Court noted,
manufacturers can use vertical restraints to "induce retailers to engage in
promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the
efficient marketing of their products."32 Because of the "free rider" effect, such
"services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive
situation . . .. 33
Vertical intrabrand non-price restraints are ubiquitous in the United States.
No one today seriously questions a manufacturer's general right to utilize
distributors assigned to certain territories. In jettisoning Schwinn after just ten
years, the GTE Sylvania majority relied expressly on the then-emerging work of
Richard Posner.34 In fact, the majority cited to Posner's work numerous times
throughout its opinion.3 5 The GTE Sylvania majority, however ignored Posner
when it tried to explain its disparate treatment of non-price vertical restraints and
price restraints (resale price maintenance). In fact, the majority insinuated that it
was relying on Posner as support for the proposition that resale price
26. See id.
27. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Corp., 433 U.S. 36, 44 (1977).
28. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379.
29. GTESylvania, 433 U.S. at 54 (emphasis added) (quoting Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 55.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 48 n. 13 (citing Richard Posner, Note, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of
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maintenance, unlike vertical territorial restrictions, if enacted "'industry-
wide[,]"' could "'facilitate cartelizing."' 36 As Justice White pointed out in his
concurring opinion, however, the same Posner article concluded that:
"There is no basis for choosing between (price fixing and market division)
on social grounds. If resale price maintenance is like dealer price fixing, and
therefore bad, a manufacturer's assignment of exclusive territories is like market
division, and therefore bad too .... [](If helping new entrants break into a
market) is a good justification for exclusive territories, it is an equally good
justification for resale price maintenance, which as we have seen is simply
another method of dealing with the free-rider problem . . .. In fact, any argument
that can also be made on behalf of exclusive territories can also be made on
behalf of resale price maintenance."37
Thus, with GTE Sylvania, the Court acknowledged the pro-competitive
nature of most non-price vertical restraints while refusing to concede the same
pro-competitive effects justified rule of reason treatment for vertical price
restraints. Mercifully, the Court changed course in 2007 with its opinion in
Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. Still, however, both types of
restraints can be condemned-at least in theory-under a rule of reason.
B. Vertical Intrabrand Price Restraints
For almost a century, U.S. antitrust law maintained the fiction of a per se
rule against resale price maintenance. The law on vertical resale price
maintenance (the most common vertical price restraint) fundamentally
changed-ostensibly-in 2007, when the United States Supreme Court struck
down the nearly century-old law applying the per se rule to agreements between
a manufacturer and its customers regarding resale prices.38 Prior to Leegin, at
least on paper, agreements between manufacturers and downstream sellers
regarding price were per se illegal under Section 1.39
Dr. Miles' reasoning, however, was folly, and a per se ban soon proved
unworkable.40  For the next 75 years, the Court chipped away at Dr. Miles'
reach, beginning just seven years later with United States v. Colgate & Co. 41
Colgate held that unilateral action by a manufacturer to set price was legal,
since, without multiple actors, there could be no agreement in violation of
Section 1.42 Colgate thus allowed a manufacturer to set "suggested" retail prices
36. Id. at 51 n.18 (quoting Posner, supra note 31, at 294 (footnote omitted in original)) (citing Richard
Posner,Antitrust: Cases, Economic Notes and Other Materials, 134 (1974)).
37. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69 n.10 (White, J., concurring) (citing Posner, supra note 31, at 292-93
(footnote omitted in original)).
38. See Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
39. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
40. Indeed, in a dissent that has proved much more memorable than the majority opinion, Oliver
Wendell Holmes argued that the per se ban protected free-riding dealers (in his words, "knaves"). Dr. Miles,
220 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that he could not "believe that in the long run the public will
profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own, and thus
to impair, if not to destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be desirable that the public
should be able to get"). The concern for free-riding has been a primary justification for the Court's many
efforts to "chip away" at the reach of Dr. Miles before finally overruling it in Leegin.
41. 250 U.S. 300, 300 (1919).
42. Id. at 307.
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so long as it did not reach an agreement with its retailers that they would adhere
to them. Manufacturers could adopt unilateral policies (for almost a century
known as "Colgate policies") that provided for termination of "cheating"
discounting dealers. The problems came when a discounting retailer, after being
"caught" by the manufacturer, asked for a "second chance." If a manufacturer
elected not to terminate the cheating retailer, this act of forgiveness created an
agreement between the manufacturer and the now-spared retailer, because the
latter has either expressly or at least implicitly agreed not to continue selling
below the manufacturer's suggested resale price.
Thus, after Colgate:
(1) A manufacturer who announces to its dealer: "I only sell to
dealers who resell at the prices I determine in advance," and
then asks "will you agree to my terms?," has invited a resale
price maintenance agreement. If the dealer responds "yes, I
accept your terms," the dealer and the manufacturer have
entered into an agreement o fix minimum resale prices."
(2) On the other hand, if the manufacturer announces: "I only
sell to dealers that resell at the prices I determine in advance,"
but then asks only "would you like to place an order?," it can
arguably assert that no "agreement" has been reached, even if
the sale is made, and even if the evidence discloses that the
dealer thereafter adhered to the mandated price.43
"This technical and artificial legal fiction is unrelated to economic
analysis. "44
Resale price maintenance litigation is usually initiated by an embittered,
terminated dealer.45 Prior to Leegin, this often meant that the "victimized"
plaintiff was seeking damages arising from a per se unlawful agreement of
which it had happily once been a part. This absurdity may have helped limit Dr.
Miles' practical reach before Leegin.
In 1984, for example, the Supreme Court made it still more difficult for a
terminated dealer to establish the requisite agreement between a manufacturer
and its remaining dealers.4 6 In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., the
Court held that proof of an agreement required more than proof that a rival
dealer complained about the discounting of the now-terminated dealer-
plaintiff.47
43. GAVIL, KOVACIC, & BAKER, supra note 7 at 371.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Continental TV., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 39 (1977) (brought by dealer
following termination); Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 884 (2007) (involving
the same).
46. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
47. Id. (holding that to "permit the inference of concerted action on the basis of receiving complaints
alone and thus expose the defendant to treble damages liability would both inhibit management's exercise of
independent business judgment and emasculate the terms of the statute") (quoting Edward J. Sweeny & Sons,
Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)).
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Just four years later, the Court again confronted resale price maintenance,
and again it made prosecution of a resale price maintenance claim more difficult
(but still without overruling Dr. Miles). Beyond just reaffirming Monsanto, the
Court argued that, to prevail on a resale price maintenance claim, a terminated
"price-cutter" must show a "further agreement on the price or price levels to be
charged by the remaining dealer."48 In other words, even a proven agreement
between a rival and a manufacturer to terminate a discounter was insufficient to
prevail under a supposed per se rule.
It was another 23 years before the Supreme Court finally killed off Dr.
Miles.49 In so doing, the Court noted the many pro-competitive virtues of resale
price maintenance, including: (1) stimulating interbrand competition; (2)
assuring adequate levels of retail services (by, e.g., preventing Internet-only
retailers from economic free-riding on brick-and-mortar shops); (3) facilitating
market entry for new firms and brands; and (4) encouraging retailer services that
might not otherwise be provided even absent free-riding discounters.50
Despite these potential benefits, the majority acknowledged that, in certain
instances, "vertical agreements setting minimum resale prices.. .may have
anticompetitive effects."5 1 In fact, the Court could come up with just three such
examples: (1) vertical price restraints used to facilitate a manufacturers' cartel;
(2) vertical price restraints used to facilitate a retailer cartel; and (3) vertical
price restraints "abused by a powerful manufacturer or retailer."52 In other
words, resale price maintenance can have anticompetitive effects if part of a
larger, horizontal cartel or when implemented by a monopolist in an abusive
fashion.53
C. Tying
Tying arrangements force a consumer to buy an unwanted product as a
condition for buying a product the customer does want. For example, suppose
there is a gas station at a remote intersection in the desert with no other gas
station in any direction within 100 miles. Suppose, too, that the gas station has
an integrated convenience store selling snacks, soft drinks, etc. Across the street
is a convenience store selling roughly the same selection of goods, but not
gasoline. A traveler with little gas would be forced to stop for gas if he or she
48. Bus. Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 717-18 (1988).
49. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907. Although the decision was decided by a, perhaps, surprisingly close 5-4
margin, the dissenters may have been more concerned with the stare decisis aspect of the case and, in
particular, its impact on future cases in the abortion arena. The dissent (the largely liberal Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) focused in large part on another stare decisis case decided that term-Federal
Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)--and a concurring opinion authored
by Justice Scalia. In particular, the Leegin dissent applied Scalia's six-factor stare decisis analysis to the
underlying facts in Leegin, after which it concluded that here were not sufficient grounds for overruling Dr.
Miles. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 923-27 (Breyer, J. dissenting). The (largely conservative) majority, on the other
hand, did not mention the parallel stare decisis Wisconsin Right to Life case once.
50. Leegin, at 890-92.
51. Id. at 892.
52. Id. at 892-93.
53. By way of example, consider a dominant retailer in a two-tiered distribution network. The
retailer's only competitors are much smaller retailers, who might seek to gain market share by attempting to
undercut the dominant retailer's price. The dominant retailer can pressure a manufacturer to implement a
resale price maintenance plan to insulate it from price competition at the retail level.
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could not make it to another gas station (at least 100 miles away). The gas
station could "tie" the sale of gasoline (the desired product) to the purchase of a
soft drink. It may be that the customer would prefer to purchase the soft drink
from across the street (perhaps because the stand alone convenience store has
better prices or a broader selection of soft drinks). Or, it may be that the
customer does not want a soft drink at all.
A tying agreement is a form of vertical interbrand restraints that can
constitute a per se violation of Section 1.54 Tying agreements can also be
challenged under Section 2, as well as Section 3 of the Clayton Act if the
agreements "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly . . . ."55
Although the Supreme Court first unequivocally applied the per se rule to
tying arrangements in International Salt, it had condemned ties in previous cases
as far back as 1922.56 The requisite elements of a modem per se tying claim
evolved into the following: (1) two products, with "one product conditioned on
the sale of another;" (2) "appreciable economic" power in the tying product; and
(3) a foreclosure of "a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product."57
In 1984, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 margin, declined Justice O'Connor's
invitation to remove tying agreements from the per se rubric altogether and
declined instead to evaluate all alleged ties under a rule of reason.58
Nevertheless, the majority noted that "[p]er se condemnation-condemnation
without inquiry into actual market conditions-is only appropriate only if the
existence of forcing is probable."5 9 This standard focused "on the probability of
anticompetitive consequences."60 Thus, per se condemnation of a tie that is
forced on only a single customer is inappropriate since "the resultant impact on
competition would not be sufficient to warrant the concern of antitrust law." 6 1
Similarly, when a purchaser is "forced" to buy a product he would not
otherwise have bought even from another seller [when, in the example above, the
traveler through the desert would not have purchased a soft drink from across the
street] in the tied product market, there can be no adverse impact on competition
because no portion of the market which would otherwise have been available to
other sellers has been foreclosed.62
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, argued "it [was] far too late in the
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain
tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and
54. 15 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012); see also Int'l Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (condemning
challenged tying arrangement under both the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act as a per se
offense).
56. See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 464-65 (1922); see also Int'l Bus.
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936).
57. GAVIL, KOVACIC, & BAKER, supra note 7 at 793.
58. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984) (Justice O'Connor was joined in
her concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Burger and Powell).
59.Id. at 15.
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therefore are unreasonable 'per se."'63 Justice Stevens recognized that many
tying arrangements are not anticompetitive (and thus ill-suited for per se
treatment), but he nevertheless sought to distinguish between per se illegal ties
(where the existence of "forcing is probable") from other ties that, while not
qualifying for per se treatment, would nevertheless fail under a rule of reason
analysis.64 Per the majority in Jefferson Parish, "[i]n order to prevail in the
absence of per se liability, [plaintiff] has the burden of proving that [defendant's]
contract violated the Sherman Act because it unreasonably restrained
competition[, a burden that] necessarily involves an inquiry into the actual effect
of the exclusive contract on competition ... " 65 How a tying arrangement could
have an actual adverse effect on competition if there is no degree of forcing,
however, is not satisfactorily explained by the Court.
Justice O'Connor (and the other concurring Justices) were similarly
confused by the majority's tortured attempt to distinguish ties that fall under the
rule of reason from ties that are per se illegal. O'Connor proposed that all ties
should be evaluated under the rule of reason.66 Even then, under O'Connor's
proposed test, a tying agreement would constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade only in "rare" circumstances, primarily when a firm with a monopoly in
one product tied uses that product to acquire additional market power in the
market for the tied product.67
Recent scholarship has given the muddled logic of Jefferson Parish
something of a pass. Einer Elhauge, for example, argues (correctly) that "the
quasi-per se rule on tying has never truly been a per se rule . . ." but goes on to
say that "Jefferson Parish was never wrong; it was just misunderstood."68
Misunderstood is one word. Disfavored is another, arguably more accurate term.
Consider the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's
opinion in United States v. Microsoft Corp.69 In that case, the district court had
applied the per se rule to the Government's claim under Section 1, alleging that
Microsoft had illegally tied the Internet Explorer Web Browser to its Windows
Operating System.70 While reaffirming Jefferson Parish's pronouncement that i
was "'far too late in the history of antitrust jurisprudence to question the
proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk to stifling
competition and therefore are unreasonable "per se[,]"'" 71 the Court of Appeals
then created its own exception to the per se rule-holding that that rule of reason
63. Id. at 9. Of course, as further discussed supra, the Court, in 2007, turned away from nearly one-
hundred years of per se condemnation of resale price maintenance agreements and ruled that, going forward,
such agreements should be subject to rule of reason analysis. See Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
64. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-15.
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that tying "may be economically primarily harmful in
the rare cases where power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional market power in the
market for the tied product" (emphasis in original)).
68. Elhauge, supra note 18, at, 463, 465.
69. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
70. See id. at 84.
71. Id. at 89-90 (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9) (emphasis in original).
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should govern tying agreements involving software products.72
Elhauge argues that tying should not be per se legal even if there is no
likelihood of substantial foreclosure in the market for the tied product, as such
ties may still be anticompetitive.73 According to Elhauge, this is because, in
certain instances (and contrary to the single monopoly profits theory), a firm can
charge more through tying than through selling just the tying product at a
monopoly price.74 This article takes no position on this hypothesis (other than
noting that Professor Elhauge's position does not appear to consider the
increased transaction costs of an inefficient rule), but notes that his position is
not at odds with the thesis of this article (which does not stand or fall with the
single monopoly profits theory). All tying arrangements, to be effectual, require
market power in the tying product. Without market power in the tying product,
there can be no coercion, no harm, and, thus, no violation. A tying arrangement
by a monopolist that allows it to extract profits even greater than could be earned
by charging the monopoly price for the unbundled product (the focus of
Elhauge's article), could be challenged under Section 2. Therefore, it need not
be actionable under Section 1 (or under Section 3 of the Clayton Act) if it is truly
anticompetitive-there remains a remedy for a truly victimized plaintiff.
D. Price Discrimination
Price discrimination comes in two basic varieties: (1) primary line
discrimination (in which a firm sells below its own cost to drive out a rival), and
(2) secondary line price discrimination (in which a firm favors one of its
customers over a second customer in competition with the first). Robert Bork
argued in THE ANTITRUST PARADOX that laws prohibiting price discrimination
run contrary to economic efficiency and, thus, price discrimination should be per
se legal.75 Bork is hardly alone in his view.
The Robinson-Patman Act, the statute that outlaws such price
discrimination, is a protectionist piece of legislation left over from the Great
Depression.76 Originally, it was intended to curb the rise of large chain stores at
the expense of smaller "mom and pop" businesses.77 Indeed, the Robinson-
Patman Act is almost universally reviled by academics (who find it inefficient
and unnecessary), practicing lawyers (who object to the needless difficulties
created by the law and its many judicially-created exceptions), and businesses
72. See id at 89 (noting that there are "strong reasons to doubt" that "the integration of additional
software functionality into an OS falls among [per se] arrangements").
73. Elhauge, supra note 18, at 467.
74. Id. at 470.
75. BORK, supra note 9, at 382 (equating the Robinson-Patman Act to "a baseball player who, although
a weak hitter, was also a poor fielder," Bork noted that it "does not prevent much price discrimination" but has
"at least ... stifled a great deal of competition").
76. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (2012); D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 Geo.Wash.L.Rev.
2064, 2069 (2015).
77. See John B. Kirkwood, The Robinson-Patman Act and Consumer Welfare: Has Volvo Reconciled
Them?, 30 SEATTLE U. L.REV. 349, 349 (2007) (referring to the "Robinson-Patman Act as the "black sheep of
antitrust law").
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(who frequently ignore the Act altogether).78 As just one example, the Antitrust
Modernization Commission (established in 2002 and consisting of four members
appointed by the President, four members appointed by the Senate, and four
members appointed by the House of Representatives) recommended repealing
the Robinson-Patman Act.79
While Bork's influence has helped move the ball slowly towards his goal of
per se legality for price discrimination, the irony is that the inroads that have
been made in the state of the law more confusing and less efficient. While it is
more difficult now than in years past to bring and prevail on a secondary price
discrimination case (and all but impossible to prevail on a primary line price
discrimination case), the law remains on the books, tempting private plaintiffs
with the prospect of the automatic trebling of damages and an award of fees and
costs.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
The current state of the law of vertical restraints, as we might say in the
South, is "a hot mess." In all areas of vertical restraints analysis, courts have
moved away from draconian per se rules of illegality, but they have not moved
far enough. We currently are in a purgatory where very few challenged vertical
restraints are condemned, but the possibility of condemnation is great enough
that, in many instances, even moderately risk-averse firms are forced to be
overly and inefficiently cautious.
A. Current Vertical Restraints Law is Confusing
From the perspective of both the academician and the practitioner, the
current state of vertical restraints law is unnecessarily vexing. For instance, how
should attorneys counsel their clients to balance the efficiencies and benefits of
providing volume discounts to large customers against a possible civil action for
treble damages by a jilted smaller customer? Is a skittish firm less likely to
bundle products efficiently out of fear of being hit with a "quasi per se" tying
lawsuit? These are nettlesome questions to be sure, but they are by no means the
most troublesome arising out of the current state of the law regarding vertical
restraints.
Perhaps no area of antitrust jurisprudence is a greater source for headaches
for antitrust attorneys than the law regarding resale price maintenance. For
decades, firms followed (usually rather loosely) the parameters that grew out of
Colgate,80  promulgating "unilateral" suggested resale prices. Today,
manufacturers, vaguely aware that a recent Supreme Court decision has made
resale price maintenance in some respect less illegal, want to know how, post-
Leegin, they can dispense with continued, awkward adherence to a Colgate
policy.
78. "The Robinson-Patman Act may well be the most reviled of all antitrust laws." Douglas L. Wald,
Recent Court Decisions Make Complying with the Robinson-Patman Act Even More Confounding, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997, at 25.
79. Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report & Recommendations at 311-32 (Apr. 2, 2007).
80. 250 U.S. 300, 300 (1919).
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Ironically, Leegin does little to alter the advice an antitrust lawyer is likely
to give a client seeking to navigate resale price maintenance waters. While
successful challenges may be quite rare, the door is still open for a litigious
retailer to challenge price agreements between a manufacturer and other
retailers. Therefore, the soundest advice is for a firm-as before-to unilaterally
announce its pricing policies. Might a cheating retailer be given a "second
chance," which, historically, has been deemed an agreement on price, thereby
give rise to per se liability for both the manufacturer and the repentant retailer?
If so, the fact that a manufacturer had-at least on paper-a Colgate policy and
made reasonable efforts to adhere to it, likely renders the agreement "reasonable
enough" to withstand serious challenge under Section 1.
But why bother with trying to adhere to Colgate at all? Are there
circumstances where resale price maintenance agreements are truly
anticompetitive? In Leegin, the Court articulated three instances where resale
price maintenance agreements may be unreasonable. All involved either
horizontal cartel activity (at either the retailer or manufacturer level) or
monopolization.81 If there is a manufacturer cartel, there is a classic per se
illegal agreement, rendering the resale price maintenance question moot. The
same is true if there is a retailer cartel-the presence of a horizontal cartel would
trigger the per se rule encompassing all of the cartel activity.8 2 Finally, if the
resale price maintenance in question is directed by a monopolist or a
monopsonist, then that conduct could be challenged under Section 2.83 If these
are indeed only situations in which resale price maintenance agreements could
be anticompetitive, then there is no need for additional enforcement hrough
Section 1.
B. Economic Inefficiencies Abound Due to Over-Deterrence
The fact that vertical restraints are not per se lawful under Section 1
(however rare a successful challenge may be) necessarily results in firms taking
more precaution than is ideal to avoid the possibility of being sued for treble
damages under the antitrust laws. For example, despite no reported successful
resale price maintenance challenges post-Leegin, manufacturers are likely to at
least give the appearance of implementing and enforcing unilateral price
policies. For those manufacturers selling in a state where resale price
maintenance agreements are per se illegal under state law, adherence to a
Colgate policy, silly as it may be, is still required. If resale price maintenance
agreements were per se legal under Section 1, only potential monopolists would
have any reason to seek legal advice regarding resale price maintenance, as
81. Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 892-93 (2007) (noting that resale
price maintenance may be, on balance, anticompetitive when used to "facilitate a manufacturer cartel," used
"'to organize cartels at the retail level[,]' or "abused by a powerful manufacturer or retailer" (quoting Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988)).
82.Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893. Moreover, the "source of the restraint may also be an important
consideration" because if there is evidence that "retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is
a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer." Id.
at 897-98.
83. This would be all the more intuitive because the artificial distinction between a "unilateral"
Colgate policy and an agreement would be irrelevant under a Section 2 analysis.
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opposed to now, where resale price maintenance legal counseling is ubiquitous
in the business world.84
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
All vertical restraints should be per se legal under Section 1. Can a vertical
restraint, on balance, be anticompetitive? While perhaps very uncommon, it is
possible, but only if the party imposing the restraint has market power in some
relevant market.
Robert Bork and Richard Posner were correct that vertical restraints all
impact the market in generally the same way and should thus be accorded
uniform treatment.8 5 Recall that the Leegin majority opinion could posit no
anticompetitive examples of resale price maintenance that did not necessarily
implicate a monopolization offense.86 Because all vertical restraints operate in
the same way on the market, plausible anticompetitive examples of price
discrimination, price and territorial restrictions, and, of course, tying (which
necessarily involves the conduct of a firm with market power in at least one
product) all involve conduct that would be more appropriate for challenge under
Section 2.
As an example, primary line price discrimination, where a manufacturer
sells below an "appropriate" level of cost, is rarely successful and, thus,
consumers usually benefit from a firm's below cost pricing.87 Predatory pricing
is a concern only when rivals are driven out and the price-cutting monopolist can
then raise prices to such a level for a sufficient period of time that the monopolist
can recoup its price-cutting losses.88 For that to occur, the price-cutter must
necessarily have successfully excluded rivals (who could not sustain as long of a
matching price-cutting campaign), which would give rise to a textbook Section 2
claim.
As another example, consider a secondary line price discrimination claim.
A Manufacturer ("M") sells its products to two retailers ("SI" and "S2") who are
in direct competition with one another. M favors S1 and disfavors S2, and
provides preferential pricing to SI but not to S2. To the extent S2 can purchase
products from another manufacturer, what harm has it suffered? If there are
multiple other retailers (acting independently and not collusively), where is the
harm to competition? Intrabrand competition may be harmed, but not interbrand
84. Horizontal cartels, due to their hidden nature, would be very unlikely to seek counseling as to
ancillary vertical restraints in furtherance of their illegal activity.
85. Posner, supra note 31 at 292-93; Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977
SUP. CT. REV. 171, 171 (criticizing the Supreme Court's GTE Sylvania decision for taking "care to distinguish
indistinguishable business practices [vertical market division and vertical price restraints] and to suggest that
vertical market divisions might be unlawful under some (unspecified) circumstances").
86. 551 U.S. at 897-98. This disregards the Court's references to horizontal agreements to implement
resale price maintenance agreements, which, as noted supra, renders any resale price maintenance claims
superfluous and trivial.
87. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993).
88. See id. at 224 ("Recoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing scheme; it is
the means by which a predator profits from predation. Without it, predatory pricing produces lower aggregate
prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced.").
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competition, which today is the focus of antitrust law.89 Harm to competition
(and any danger of increased prices to consumers) is not a risk until there is but
one distribution channel for a seller with market power. If there are still multiple
retailers selling M's product in competition with one another, the loss of one
disfavored retailer does not alter the competitive landscape (which is what
Robinson-Patman critics have argued for decades).
Is it possible for secondary line price discrimination to cause actual harm to
competition? Perhaps. If M is a monopolist, it could seek to move downstream
and monopolize the retail market. Competition among retailers can help check
such a monopolist manufacturer's power. Or-and this is more likely-a
dominant retailer could induce favorable pricing that allows it to drive rivals
from the marketplace. In each of these examples lies a Section 2 claim.9 0
Absent the abuse or attempted expansion of market power by a monopolist,
there is little real danger to competition from vertical restraints unless such
restraints are used to facilitate a horizontal cartel. Of course, the use of such
vertical restraints to facilitate a cartel would not immunize that cartelization or
monopolization. Cartels are per se illegal under Section 1, regardless of the
tools used to facilitate the collusion.
Transaction costs, in the form of legal counseling fees and expenses and
unnecessary and undesirable litigation, are increased by the current uncertain
state of the law. A per se rule of legality for vertical restraints under Section 1
would minimize the uncertainty and greatly diminish these unnecessary costs.
How much easier it would be for lawyers to counsel clients if only they did
not have to navigate the vertical restraints minefield of exceptions, defenses, and
outdated protectionist policies and law. As but one example, resale price
maintenance agreements challenged under federal law are evaluated under the
rule of reason. Because a few states still maintain a per se ban on resale price
maintenance agreements, however, manufacturers selling nationwide must still
take care to act "unilaterally."
Suppose a manufacturer opts to eschew the headaches of a Colgate policy
and instead rolls the dice under federal law that its resale price maintenance
"agreements" are reasonable. Following Leegin, the manufacturer is very likely
ultimately to prevail if its agreements are challenged. Notwithstanding that
success, if the agreements covered sale in, for example, New York, that
manufacturer would be in violation of New York's per se ban on resale price
maintenance agreements.9 1 This absurd result-where the same restraint is
lawful and reasonable under federal law but illegal under state law could not
occur if such restraints were deemed per se lawful. If vertical restraints are per
se legal, contrary state laws would be preempted, greatly enhancing clarity and
89. See Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 180 (2006)
(quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 n.19 (1977) (noting that "[i]nterbrand
competition ... is the 'primary concern of antitrust law')).
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (2012) (prohibiting "any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section").
91. Antitrust Enforcement, ATTORNEY GENERAL ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/antitrust/antitrust-enforcement (the New York Attorney General's office reiterates that
"[r]esale price maintenance violates New York law").
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simplicity in application of vertical restraints law.
A. Anticompetitive Restraints Can Be Fully Addressed Under Section 2.
1. There is no plausible argument against per se legality of non-price territorial
restraints under Section 1.
Sylvania moved the ball in the right direction, but it did not go far enough.
A manufacturer should be given the freedom to distribute its products in the
manner it deems fit. For almost forty years, the Supreme Court has maintained
(not always consistently) that the primary concern of antitrust laws is interbrand
competition, and not intrabrand competition.9 2 It is difficult to imagine a non-
price, intrabrand restraint that would threaten competition. Here, the danger of
over-deterrence is much greater than the almost negligible danger of under-
deterrence.
From a practitioner's standpoint, however, it would be malpractice to
counsel a client that vertical territorial restraints are per se legal. They should
be, but they are not. As a result, antitrust practitioners are forced to warn their
clients that "the pro-competitive benefits . . . must offset any harm to
competition[,]" determined after examining "the purpose of the vertical
restriction, the effect of such restriction in limiting competition in the relevant
market, and, importantly, the market share of the supplier imposing the
restraint."9 3 International law firm Sidley Austin LLP concludes its online
summary of vertical restraints by noting that so "long as inter-brand competition
is strong, courts typically find territorial restraints lawful under the rule of
reason."94
The fact that courts "typically" find restraints lawful is small comfort to a
large, risk-averse supplier with many dealers or distributors who purchase from
it (any one of whom, if terminated for whatever reason, is a potential plaintiff).
Moreover, a firm weighing the risks imposing territorial distribution restraints
must consider not only the possibility of a treble damages judgment, but also the
costs of defending an antitrust lawsuit, even if were to prevail.95 Unfortunately,
Professor Sokol's characterization of vertical territorial restrictions as per se
legal is incorrect.
There is hope, however. Vertical territorial restraints are rarely condemned
absent monopoly power.9 6 Treating vertical territorial restraints as per se legal
under Section 1 does not then impact the likelihood that a meritorious challenge
will succeed (because that challenge could proceed under Section 2), but it
would eliminate the possibility of a lawsuit or counterclaim from being initiated
92. See Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 n.19 (1977).
93. Joel Mitnick, Vertical Agreements. The regulation of distribution practices in 36jurisdictions
worldwide, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP 303, 307 (2013),
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/files/publications/2013/03/getting-the-deal-through--vertical-agreements-
2013/files/view-united-states-chapter/fileattachment/va2013-united-states.pdf.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (noting that "proceeding to antitrust
discovery can be expensive").
96. See Sokol, supra note 5 (citing Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under
the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71 (1992)); Mitnick, supra, note 90.
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when there is lacking even the possibility of harm to competition.
This may not seem like a large gap to close to the academic, but to the
practitioner it is substantial. Consider a client seeking advice on structuring a
distribution network with commonplace territorial restrictions in place to lessen
intrabrand competition. Under the proposed rule, if the client could not
plausibly be considered a monopolist, as will be the case in the vast majority of
cases, then that is where the risk of antitrust liability ends. The answer to the
client would be simple and inexpensive-there is no way to run afoul of the
antitrust laws on account of the structuring of one's distribution network.
2. There is no plausible argument against per se legality of resale price
maintenance agreements under Section 1.
As Richard Posner noted over 30 years ago, there is no substantive division
between vertical territorial restraints and vertical price restraints.97 For the same
reason the territorial restraints in GTE Sylvania should be per se legal, so too
should price restraints-most notably agreements on resale price maintenance
and minimum advertised pricing should be per se legal under Section 1. The
Supreme Court's Leegin opinion underscores this-all of the anticompetitive
resale price maintenance scenarios given involve monopolization in violation of
Section 2 or stand-alone horizontal cartel activity in per se violation of Section
of 1.
Per se legality of vertical price restraints would also serve to preempt state
laws still embracing the per se illegality rule of Dr. Miles. This means
manufacturers need not research-and keep abreast of-current state laws
regarding resale price maintenance. It also means they can have one overarching
national sales and pricing policy, with no need for isolated pockets of
"throwback" Colgate policies for, e.g., New York or Maryland.
Is it possible that prices to consumers will be higher under a per se legal
standard? Possibly, but that is not to say that there would necessarily be a
diminishment in consumer welfare. Consumers in most instances could expect
more informed and better-trained (and thus more helpful) sales personnel as well
as better post-sale service. Moreover, the certainty and clarity provided to
manufacturers would increase total welfare (by increasing overall efficiency)
without harming consumers.
3. There is no plausible argument against per se legality of tying arrangements
under Section 1.
Tying is the most complex vertical restraint, but for purposes of this article
it is the easiest restraint for which to justify per se legal treatment under Section
1. Tying, in all cases, should be per se legal under Section 1 or, given that tying
agreements can also be challenged under Section 3 of the Clayton Act or Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, perhaps it is better to state the argument
that tying should be subject to challenge only under Section 2. True, tying
agreements, in certain circumstances, can facilitate price discrimination, but, for
97. Posner, supra note 34.
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reasons articulated elsewhere in this Article, price discrimination should also be
per se legal under any statute other than Section 2.
While all ties necessarily involve market power in the tying product, the
vast majority of ties are, on balance, pro-competitive.98 When are they, on
balance, anticompetitive? When they facilitate monopolization in violation of
Section 2. Tying can also facilitate monopolization in two ways. First, in very
limited situations, a tying agreement can allow the monopolist in the tying
product to achieve market power in the tied product.99 Tying can allow a firm
with market power in a tying product whose price is capped through regulation
to circumvent the regulatory price caps and secure monopoly profits through
tying.100 Both of these examples would constitute illegal monopolization under
Section 2, because both involve the illegal maintenance or expansion of a
monopoly.
Because tying necessarily involves market power in at least one market (the
"tying" product), monopolization will always be an issue in tying cases.
Because of the arguably "quasi per se" treatment of ties historically, plaintiffs
have opted, whenever possible, for the much lower proof thresholds of Section 1.
This is analogous to forum shopping, and the truth is that no aggrieved plaintiff
needs Section 1 to pursue a valid tying claim.
4. Primary line price discrimination should not be actionable unless it
establishes a claim under Section 2.
It is doubtful, absent the most rare and extreme facts, one can prevail on a
primary line price discrimination action today. The vast majority of below-cost
pricing schemes, to the extent they exist, actually benefit consumers.101 If there
is a set of facts in which a monopolist could likely recoup its investment, such
conduct would support a claim under Section 2 for monopolization. If so, it
would be yet another example of conduct, which, while ordinarily permissible,
may not be legal if undertaken by a monopolist.102 Otherwise, there is no danger
of actual harm to competition and, as such, challenges should fail under any
antitrust statue, including the Robinson-Patman Act.103 And why punish the
98. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
abrogated (on other grounds) by Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
99. Id. (noting that tying may be "economically harmful primarily in the rare cases where power in the
market for the tying product is used to create additional market power in the market for the tied product"
(emphasis in original)).
100. Id. at n.4.
101. Not surprisingly, the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association views primary line cases
with considerable skepticism, noting that "[c]laims of predatory pricing are extremely difficult to prove and
usually are defeated on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment." Ross E. Elfand, The Robinson-Patman
Act, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young lawyers/publications/the_101 201_practice_series/robinsonpatma
n-act.html.
102. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951) ("The publisher claims a right
as a private business concern to select its customers and to refuse to accept advertisement from whomever it
pleases. We do not dispute that general right. But the word 'right' is one of the most deceptive pitfalls .... In
the absence ofany purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right
of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." (emphasis added)).
103.See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012) (condemning price discrimination "where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
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below-cost pricing itself? The focus should instead be on whether a firm is able
to exclude competitors from the market over time, an analysis that does not
require a separate action for primary line price discrimination.
5. Secondary line price discrimination should not be actionable unless it
establishes a claim under Section 2.
Secondary line price discrimination, most often involving a manufacturer
providing preferential pricing to a favored dealer, is in some ways even less
appropriate for condemnation (absent certain monopolization scenarios) than
primary line price discrimination. Why? Because secondary line price
discrimination does not, even if successful, freeze out a competitor of the
manufacturer. Rather, it disadvantages one or more distributors or retailers vis-
A-vis a favored distributor or retailer. Currently, placing a distributor or retailer
at a disadvantage can trigger treble-damages liability, when simply cutting off
the disfavored distributor or retailer is perfectly legal.
Such a rule makes little sense. For one, it encourages a manufacturer to
simply cut off a smaller or disfavored distributor or retailer altogether, rather
than simply provide them product on unequal terms. Second, absent market
power of the manufacturer, there is likely no injury to competition (and if there
were market power, of course Section 2 would provide an aggrieved party with
an opportunity for redress), because the disfavored buyer could look to another
manufacturer for the product in question. Even the Federal Trade Commission
acknowledges that "[c]ourts may be starting to limit [the competitive injury]
inference to situations in which either the buyer or the seller has market power,
on the theory that, for example, lasting competitive harm is unlikely if
alternative sources are available."104 As with primary line price discrimination,
absent monopolization, there can be no injury to competition. While there may
be harm inflicted upon a disfavored distributor or retailer, the antitrust laws
protect competition generally rather than individual competitors.105
V. THE LAW WILL CONTINUE TO EVOLVE TOWARDS PER LEGALITY FOR
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
This Article argues not only what the law should be; it also predicts that we
will inevitably arrive there one day. Why? Because current vertical restraints
law is massively inefficient, and the law, over time, will evolve to correct these
inefficiencies.
The law generally evolves in an efficient direction over time. There are at
least two accepted reasons why this is so. First, as Posner believes, judge-made
law tends to be efficiency-enhancing.106 That is, all things being equal, judges
commerce"). While the underlying economics may not have been fully understood at the time Robinson-
Patman was enacted, we know now that there is little danger of any appreciable harm to competition if a
restraint does not also "tend to create a monopoly. . . ." Id.
104.Price Discrimination: Robinson-Patman Violations,FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/price-discrimination-
robinson-patman.
105.See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
106.See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, 495-99 (3d. ed. 495-99).
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prefer to create efficiency-enhancing rules. Certainly in the antitrust law realm,
courts have endeavored to do just that (if the results are, perhaps, sometimes
mixed). The Sylvania Court relied extensively on the recent scholarship of
"Professor" Posner.10 7 Two decades later, the Leegin Court likewise courted
efficiency, noting that "it [per se treatment of resale price maintenance
agreements] is a flawed antitrust doctrine that serves the interests of
lawyers ... 1"o8  And in Volvo Trucks, the Court, grounded in its current
understanding of economics, reminded us that its "'primary concern of antitrust
law"' was "[i]nterbrand competition."109
Lower Courts have followed suit as well. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, despite affirming many of the verdicts against
Microsoft under Section 2, overruled the district court's per se treatment of the
accusation that Microsoft had tied its browser (Internet Explorer) to its Windows
Operating Systems.110 On remand, the DOJ and various states prosecuting
claims elected not to pursue their tying claim under a rule of reason theory."'I
Why? Because there was no need, as the underlying conduct had been
adequately addressed in the broader monopolization case against Microsoft.
The second reason the law trends towards efficiency is that efficient rules
are less likely to be challenged over time, while inefficient rules will more likely
be challenged.112 Succinctly put, according to Priest, inefficient rules impose
greater costs on parties and are thus more likely to be challenged.113 Further, the
more frequently inefficient rules are challenged, the more likely they are to be
corrected.1 14 While some cases will inevitably be incorrectly decided-resulting
in an efficient rule being replaced by an inefficient one-overall the trend will
always be to a more efficient system of laws.
Current vertical restraints law produces inefficient results in the form of
increased transaction costs, attorneys' fees, unnecessary uncertainty on the part
of market participants, and over-deterrence of perceived harms to competition by
risk averse market participants. Non-price vertical restraints are not the source
of much controversy these days, but such was not always the case. In a now
infamous case, just 44 years ago, the Supreme Court declared vertical intrabrand
restraints to be per se unlawful.115 At the time, the Court (or at least a majority
of its members) did not appreciate the economic distinction between interbrand
107. See generally 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
108. 551 U.S. 877, 904 (2007).
109. 546 U.S. 164, 180 (2006) (quoting Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-
52 n.19 (1977)).
110. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
111. GAvIL, KOVACIC, & BAKER, supra note 7, 822.
112. George Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
65, 67 (1977) (arguing that "litigation will be more likely for disputes arising under inefficient rules than for
those arising under efficient rules").
113. See id. (noting that "the costs imposed by inefficient rules will always be higher than the costs
imposed by efficient rules").
114. See id. at 72 (arguing that "[ilnefficient rules perish because they are more likely to be reviewed
and review implies the chance of change. . ..") (internal quotations omitted).
115. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972). In Topco, the majority
condemned an intrabrand grocery store cooperative of small, independent brands that utilized territorial




restraints and intrabrand restraints.116 Just five years later however, in GTE
Sylvania, a majority of the Court's members recognized that vertical non-price
restrictions "generally ... are [un]likely to cause a 'pernicious effect on
competition' or to that they lack . .. any redeeming virtue."117 It was still not
ready, however, to recognize the fallacy of trying to distinguish between vertical
non-price and price restrictions.118
It took until 2007 for the law on vertical price restraints to catch up with
Sylvania, but, now that it has, the changes are less than one would have hoped.
Holdover states with "Dr. Miles" laws and the possibility-however remote-of
a successful treble damages claim brought under the antitrust laws artificially
restrict the number of reasonable and beneficial resale price maintenance
programs. Why make countless firms go through the motions of creating and
adhering to a "Colgate policy?"
Notwithstanding the economic complexities of tying agreements, it is no
longer disputed that most ties are pro-competitive and beneficial to
consumers.119 Given that the vast majority of ties are pro-competitive, it makes
little sense to subject ties to a "quasi-per se" rule, even when a degree of forcing
is "probable". Of course, without a degree of forcing, there is almost assuredly
insufficient market power in the tying product to cause any economic harm.
Plaintiffs, who are not actually victimized, are left over-incentivized to bring
tying claims for imaginary or cooked-up antitrust injuries.
Finally, there is price discrimination-a leftover piece of protectionist
legislation from the Great Depression, which has never been accused of making
good economic sense. Courts have sensibly made recovery for primary line
price discrimination almost impossible. But the very slight sliver of a possibility
that remains may well discourage below-cost pricing or promotions that would
otherwise benefit consumers. How ironic, that fear of consequences under the
antitrust laws, may be depriving consumers of the benefits of lower prices.
Secondary line price discrimination law is no better. As both Bork and Posner
have argued for years, price discrimination prohibitions result in the "needless
deformation of market processes and the destruction of [enormous] national
wealth."1 20 In the case of price discrimination, Robinson-Patman is an open
secret. Perhaps no legislator wants to lead the charge to repeal a statute that,
when enacted, was intended to protect "mom and pop" shops in Middle
America, but it is curious the extent to which we continue to subject ourselves to
the statute's harmful influences.
116. See id. at 614 (Burger, C.J. dissenting) (noting that the majority decision reversing the district
court not only failed to increase interbrand competition, it would "substantially diminish competition in the
supermarket field") (internal citation omitted).
117. Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
118. See id. at 70 (White, J. concurring) (chastising the majority for, despite heavily relying on Richard
Posner's analysis of vertical restraints, ignoring his conclusions that non-price and price restraints are
indistinguishable in effect and should thus be accorded the same treatment under the law).
119. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. Bork, supra note 9, at 382, 384-85 (quoting RICHARD POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES (American Enterprise Institute, 1st ed. 1976) (arguing that the
"literature of Robinson-Patman abounds with . .. such horror stories, and the total wealth loss due to this one
statute must be staggering")).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that, in time, vertical restraints will evolve into the
standards herein proposed. Defendants will be more likely to try, rather than
settle, vertical restraints cases because the current law-as applied to (a) non-
price restraints, (b) price restraints, (c) tying agreements; (d) and price
discrimination-is inefficient. Moreover, judges are more likely to select an
efficiency-enhancing rule over a less efficient alternative.
But more than simply predict how "the dust will settle," this Article
suggests that we need not wait for the inevitable but slow "correction" in the law
to occur. Rather, it is but a small step-and consistent with both Supreme Court
precedent and a plain reading of the antitrust statutes-for courts to establish that
vertical restraints will not be condemned under Section 1, the Clayton Act, or the
Robinson-Patman Act. If vertical restraints are condemned at all, such
condemnation should be under Section 2 and Section 2 alone.
If the restraint is truly anticompetitive and thus worthy of condemnation,
the harm will be addressable through Section 2. Conversely, if there is no
Section 2 claim that would arise out of the challenged conduct, the probability
that that conduct is truly anticompetitive is very slight. The uncertainty and
associated transaction costs from the current state of the rule-where very few
vertical restraints are ultimately condemned but none are immune from
challenge-far outweigh the danger of potential "false negatives" that might
arise under a per se legal rule. Under a rule of per se legality, clients could stop
paying lawyers to draft Colgate polices. Manufacturers could favor larger and
more efficient distributors if they so choose (without feeling compelled to fire
smaller, competing distributors if they would rather not deal with them on the
same terms). The muddled law of tying-which can currently trigger liability
under no fewer than three separate federal antitrust laws-would be drastically
simplified; it would be beyond challenge unless it triggered liability under
Section 2. This is where we are headed, and we should push to get there as soon
as we can.
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